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    F-35 Lightning II

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    F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Admin on pet oľu 25, 2016 5:39 pm

    Prvi zrakoplov 21 stoljeca -  F-35 ostaje u uporabi do 2070



    Fast facts:

    • Razvoj F-35 traje vec 20 godina,
    • Prvi let prototipa je bio 2003.
    • Polovinom 2015 je US Navy deklarirala F-35 Lightning II za uspjesno dostignute operacijske sposobnosti tj. mogucnost koristiti F-35 u ogranicenim borbenim akcijama.


    Trenutni plan proizvodnje je vise od 3100 borbena lovca  F-35 za americko zrakopovstvo, mornaricu, kopnene snage ka i za jos 11 drugih zemalja: UK, Izrael, Turska, Finska ili Japan. Nejasna je npr. situacija v Kanadi, gdje iako preovladava negativan stav nabavci i dalje  F-35 ima sanse za uspjeh. Svi naruceni lovci moraju biti proizvedeni do 2040.

    Sam Pentagon je planirao nabavku 2443 komada F-35 tj. potrositi oko 400 miliardi dolara.
    Razvoj, prodaja i odrzavanje F-35 po cijelom vremenu  životnosti bi stajao americke porezne obveznike na skoro nevjerovatnih 1,5 bilijardi dolara (to je odprilike 30 českih godisnjih BDP).


    Kakav je odnos velicina zrakoplova u povjesti i F 35:


    US airpower past, present and future (F-35, F-22, F-16 and F-86) fly in formation . . . . .  . . . . F-35 flies in formation with its namesake, the P-38 Lightning, and two P-51 Mustangs


    Zadnja promjena: Admin; sub ruj 10, 2016 5:20 pm; ukupno mijenjano 3 put/a.
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    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Admin on pet oľu 25, 2016 8:04 pm

    evo malo i od mene (valjda nakompleksniji ispis sto je moguce naci):

    F-35 INFORMATION



    While researching exactly what the F-35 was, what benefits it brought and what features it had, i found a lack of informative and sourced descriptions available to read, this is my compendium of information i have found and compiled to give an accurate picture, everything i state is either directly sourced or within the sources listed. There is often competing information for certain aspects, I give weight to what pilots state is important and those who have relevant backgrounds or good information, i do not give credit to people who do not have the relevant backgrounds and either lack sources or misuse facts as well as those who use emotive language(usually a recourse to lacking knowledge on the subject), i would advise you to do the same.


    For a general overview of Air Power and journalism read this, for understanding stealth try this and for past & present aerial warfare review this report.
    For some of these videos, pay attention to the actual system demonstrations, ignore the narration/fancy graphics unless you want a laugh.

    F-35 Distributed Aperture System(DAS)1) Distributed Aperture System(DAS) AN/AAQ-37 is 6 Electro-Optical sensors that watch a total 570 degrees, overlapping to provide safe 360 degree observation, they are positioned such that no part of the aircraft masks it’s 360 view. DAS provides automatic missile and aircraft detection, tracking & warning and integrates imagery to the HMD.  Each aperture is interlinked to the ICP which runs the software algorithms that generates geo-registered threat reports and imagery which is then forward to either the HMD or Cockpit Display. DAS detects moving targets and has detected ballistic missile launches at 1,300km and detected tanks firing, the processing power of the ICP allows DAS to simultaneously track thousands of objects.

    2) Gen III Helmet Mounted Display System(HMDS), All the information pilots need to complete their missions – airspeed, heading, altitude, targeting information and warnings – is projected on the helmet’s visor, rather than on a traditional Heads-up Display. Additionally, the F-35’s Distributed Aperture System (DAS) streams real-time imagery from six infrared cameras mounted around the aircraft to the helmet at near 20/20 vision acuity, allowing pilots to “look through” the airframe, a small strip at the bottom provides a 360 view, a compass/mini-map in the lower right corner and indicates the direction the pilot is looking. The helmet also provides pilots night vision through the use of an integrated camera, which because it’s FLIR isn’t as sensitive to bright lights. This helmet gives the pilot exceptional Situational Awareness which is the primary driver for engagement outcomes 80% of the time. Due to the precision required, padding inside the HMD is specifically molded to each pilots head shape. Current contracts have the price of the helmet at 301k which is slightly more than JHMCs. The HMD and DAS also par very well with the new generation High Off Bore missiles that can be targeted and launched at aircraft up to 90 degrees off bore and the Lock On After Launch feature will provide 360 degree missile engagement envelope.


    Side Note: The Cockpit also features several advances, assembled by a team with 150 years of tactical aviation experience, it is dominated by two joint 10 inch by 8 inch Panoramic Cockpit Displays(PCD) with touch integration and extensive voice activation functionality, each PCD has an independent computer and can be subdivided into different modes. A few buttons do remain such as landing gear, electrical reset and engine on/off which work regardless of software. F-16/18/35 cockpits and a Norwegian comparison.

    3) Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) AN/AAQ-40, a combined FLIR and infrared search and track, it features laser designation, laser spot tracker for cooperative engagements, air-to-air and air-to-ground tracking FLIR, wide area IRST and generation of geo-coordinates to support GPS-guided weapons. It will initially be able to share still images to troops, a Common Data Link(CDL) will allow the Video feed generated to be sent to ground troops over a Rover Network, they could even control where the camera is pointed and indicate to the Pilot where they want targeted, this functionality is planned for Block 4. There are other programs aimed at furthering this interaction between ground troops and CAS. The EOTS has a long range, able to discern windows apart in a Hotel 50 miles away.


    4) AESA/APG-81 Radar, this radar is exceptional with an Active Electronically Steered Array(AESA) of 1,676 T/R modules and can do vastly more than old Passive Electronically Steered Array(PESA) radars, especially with it’s integration to the ICP. It can track more aircraft, create high def SAR maps and then automatically identify targets(ATR), use inverse SAR to detect and identify maritime objects, use passive bistatic detection methods, can jam radars in combination with ASQ-239, can be used in LPI/LPD mode where it scans at different frequencies and power rapidly to avoid detection or it can use “closed-loop tracking” where after detecting an aircraft it will only use the minimal power to keep track of the aircraft, it can use Non Cooperative Target Recognition to “Map” out aircraft to identify them or analyze their thrust signature. The F-35 also has color-weather radar for navigating thunderstorms, squall lines, and fronts and is a first for fighters. The APG-81 won the David Packard award for it’s resistance to jamming. Here’s a simulation video.


    5) AN/ASQ-239 “Barracuda”. While most aircraft carry crutch Electronic Warfare(EW) systems, the F-35’s was designed from the outset for integration, able to operate not just with other components within the aircraft such as the APG-81, it can operate with other F-35’s over MADL to perform EW operations together. The AN/ASQ-239 is an evolution of the F-22’s AN/ALR-94 which is described as the most complex and costly avionics piece on the F-22, the Barracuda has twice the reliability and is a quarter the cost of the ALR-94, as well as being able to reduce the 30 sensors on the F-22 to 10 sensors, it has demonstrated the ability to detect and jam the F-22’s radar. It’s able to precisely geo-locate emission locations hundreds of kilometers away, further then it’s radar can see and from there the APG-81 can be slaved to that data track and then detect and track the object with a very narrow beam, increasing power and detection on target while decreasing detection by other aircraft. At close range or against targets using Jammers it is capable of narrowband interleaved search and track(NBILST) against aircraft which provides precise range and velocity that can then be used by a missile without need of the APG-81, allowing 360 degree targeting of aircraft. The Barracuda can refer to it’s data-banks of known emissions and identify the source vehicle or store it for future classification. Other features are false target generation and range-gate stealing, offensive EW is possible, a towed RF decoy is also a part of the package as is MJU-68/B Flares, the counter measure dispenser’s can be seen from behind. The F-35 will also feature “cyber attack” capability.


    6) The Communications, Navigation and Information(CNI) system. The CNI uses Software-defined radio (SDR) technology, SDR uses reconfigurable RF hardware and computer processors to run software that produces a desired waveform, the CNI can manage over 27 different wave-forms. One of the new wave-forms is the MultiFunction Advanced Data Link(MADL) developed for the F-35 which has a very high data(video streaming etc) transfer rate and is very hard to intercept or jam, giving the aircraft “stealth” communications, it also acts in a Daisy Chain fashion to operate over wide areas with numerous nodes(other F-35s). The F-35 will have LPI/LPD Link-16 capability as well. With it’s full suite of communications It can give information to another aircraft enhancing their situational awareness, this allows an F-35 that has expended it’s munitions to continue to act as an AWACS, furthering network centric warfare. If an F-35 see’s a ballistic missile it can give that information to a naval vessel who can send an SM-6 after it with the F-35’s targeting data, extending the range of AEGIS, or it can provide geo-coordinate data on a vehicle somewhere and guide in artillery GPS shells/rockets or missiles(tomahawks) etc. With the AESA radar the communications system can send or receive very large amounts of data very quickly.


    7) Integrated Core Processor(ICP), Blocks and Code. At the core of the F-35 is the Computer systems, this is where all the information that every system gathers comes together and is fused then presented to the pilot. This computer system is designed to be very easy to upgrade and up to date, the power system was also designed to handle future loads as well as the use of fibre optics for high data transfer rates. The Code for the F-35 comprises 8.1 million lines, Block 1 had 76% of the code, Block 2 had an additional 6% that enabled basic avionic and weapon functionality, Block 2B is ongoing with version 2BR5, only data clean up is left and the USMC intends to declare IOC with Block 2. Block 3i will be next which the Air Force will go to IOC with, afterwards Block 3F will follow, the USN requires Block 3F for IOC. 98% of that coding is developed and in the labs, and 89% is currently flying. The estimated delay on Block 3F is 4-6 months without making changes but is within the buffer and will be ready for USN IOC. The F-35 also has very strong cryptographic security, only the US has the ability to modify the source code, but aircraft owners will be able to change geographic data.


    F-35_computer8) Autonomic Logistics Information System(ALIS) and Maintenance, ALIS receives Health Reporting information while the F-35 is still in flight, the system, with 5 million lines of code, enables the pre-positioning of parts and qualified maintainers on the ground, so that when the aircraft lands, downtime is minimized and efficiency is increased. This system is the most delayed part of the JSF program and is encountering significant software issues but has a strong potential to enable much higher sortie rates and reduced ground maintenance requirements. The F-35 has complex health management system’s throughout the aircraft and engine. The F-35 also has closed-loop Electro-Hydrostatic Actuators that require no maintenance for their entire lifetime, this feature also has the benefit of avoiding the need for manual reversion after suffering damage. The F-35 has a 200hp gas turbine engine for starting the main engine, for environmental controls and emergency power if the engine were to fail.


    9) Stealth, reportedly at 0.006m² to 0.001m² RCS or -30 dBsm(from 2005, newer comments state it’s smaller then an F-22), it has a vastly reduced detection range, what this does is reduce the enemy’s reaction times, allows the F-35 to operate outside of a targets engagement range and enables it to “first look, first shot, first kill” which sets the initiative of the fight in the F-35s favour. An F/A-18E/F has about 0.5m² RCS, if it was detected at 100nm the F-35 would be detected at 25nm. Stealth increases the effectiveness of Jamming. The F-35’s stealth is also much more maintenance friendly than previous aircraft, notably with the stealth coating cured into the skin. Another aspect of Stealth is the Thermal Signature, the F-35 incorporates lessons from the LOAN program for reduced engine RCS & thermals as well as advanced air bleeding and using the fuel as a heat sink.


    10) Performance. The F-35 was designed with “F-16/F-18 like” qualities, for the difference between those planes refer here. To get a good idea of the F-35s maneuverability through unclassified means we can use three different methods, first is pilot comments; the F-35 is remarked by Col De Smit of the RNLAF as “turns like an F-16 with pylon tanks; but it climbs, descends & accelerates like a clean F-16” also to note is the F-35 has more fuel then an F-16 with pylon tanks. This also conforms with Lt Col Lee Kloos of the USAF who said “The F-35′s acceleration is “very comparable” to a Block 50 F-16.””Again, if you cleaned off an F-16 and wanted to turn and maintain Gs and[turn] rates, then I think a clean F-16 would certainly outperform a loaded F-35″”But if you compared them at combat loadings, the F-35 I think would probably outperform it.” Captain Morten Hanche states these points in his blog as well.


    The second is Aerodynamic modeling which largely confirms the pilot quotes and allows us to make several more assumptions. At Sea Level it encounters relatively more drag(due to it’s “stubby” body) and has slightly worse performance then an F-16 but at high altitude(30k-57k) the penalty for this lessens out drastically. Carrying weapons on other aircraft significantly worsens their performance through the drag of the weapon and pylon whilst the F-35 is affected only by the weight, this makes the F-35 superior in combat loadings. F-16s and regular Hornets also require fuel tanks and pods(ECM, Targeting etc) to reach the same range/capabilities as the F-35, all of which increase drag and reduces hard-points for munitions.


    The third is through extrapolation of the KPPs which reinforces our above statements, therefore we can conclude; The F-35A’s sustained turning compared to a Block 50 F-16C is worse at low/clean profiles, equal/better at high/combat profiles. Subsonic acceleration and climb rate is the same/better as a clean/combat F-16 and transonic acceleration should be similar to a combat loaded F-16.

    A small detail is that compared to the F-16, the F-35A with “full war equipment” can cruise 10-15k feet higher without afterburner and cruise 50-80 knots faster, all of this additional energy is imparted on missiles.


    The F-16 is limited to 26 degree Angle of Attack while the F-35 can pull 50 degrees(tested up to 101), the same as the F/A-18’s, the F-35 will have “superb low speed handling characteristics and post-stall manoeuvrability” similar to the F-18 and much better then the F-16. The F-35A has been tested to 9.88G with a design load of 9G, B & C are 7/7.5G, for reference the F-16 is also 9G while the F/A-18 is limited to 7.5G. Certain external stores will reduce the limits on AoA, G-force and max speed on all aircraft. Captain Morten Hanche describes the AoA difference and how it affects fighting here.

    Combat Radius is 613nm which includes carrying 2 Aim-120s and 2x2k JDAMs over a combat profile mission, this is further then most aircraft it’s replacing, at optimal cruise range is about ~1700nm, max speed is 700KCAS or Mach 1.6 and it can supercruise at mach 1.2 for 150nm.


    Payload is a standard 8 tonnes/18k pounds internal & external over 10 hard-points, an additional center-line hard-point can carry the Multi-Mission Pod or Gun Pod. The F-35 has 2 internal bays that can carry an AIM-120 and a ≤2,500 pound bomb or 4 SDBs or an additional AIM-120(2 in Block 4) in each bay for a total up to 2.2 tonnes/5k pounds. The F-35Bs bomb rack is limited to ≤1,500 pounds. The F-35 can carry many legacy munitions externally and several internally and a few weapons are being designed specifically to fit inside weapon bays such as the Joint Strike Missile, SDB II, SOM, JAGM and some future form of the maturation programs; Joint Dual Role Air Dominance missile and Triple Target Terminator missile.

    The F-35A will posses an internal cannon(B/C will use a Pod) of 25mm caliber, the GAU-22/A which is 38% more accurate then the M61 Vulcan on Legacy jets and the same accuracy as the GAU-8 on the A-10, in addition it will have a cockpit programmable fire control system that accounts for the effects of wind and aim wonder on long-range air to ground employment opportunity. The GAU-22/A will have Armor Piercing High Explosive rounds, the combination of increased accuracy and more lethal munitions allows for a smaller ammunition storage for the same kill chance, the F-35A will have 180 rounds(Pod is 220), down from 511 on Legacy aircraft, which will probably provide 4-5 bursts.


    11) Costing. Cost is a big contentious point for the F-35 but is often misrepresented with inflationary figures in $Then Year out to 2065, if we account for inflation the JSF program will cost a total $917 Billion in $2012 dollars, this is for development, procurement and sustainment out to 2065 of 2,443 aircraft. Development and Procurement is $59 and $257 Billion respectively, another 3.9 Billion for Construction and Operations & Sustainment is $597 Billion $2012. These estimates include Cost Growth Above Inflation over the 55 years as well as a mid-life upgrade and subsystems(ECM, EOTS etc) that legacy aircraft don’t include, there are also many factors in CAPE/GAO reports that is questionable such as depot level maintenance and removal rates, the latest SAR also doesn’t include newer data such as the Cost War Room that is set to save $41 Billion. JPO maintains an O&S cost of 535 billion. Production starts off in Low Rate Initial Production(LRIP) slowing ramping up to Full Rate Production(FRP) in 2018 and up to 120 aircraft per year in 2022, the prices for each lot decrease‘s as economies of scale increase and as more efficient production techniques are learnt.


    Cost increases, there is a lot of confusion over the exact increase due to the issue of cutting aircraft and delays causing inflation to affect the amounts. In 2001 the SDD started with the idea of 2,866 aircraft and 35 billion in development but no baseline was approved, in 2003 the first baseline was approved at 2,457 aircraft(13 dedicated to testing) and 45 billion development. The original prediction was 177 Billion in $2002, this is 226 Billion in $2012 based on Bureau of Labor Statistics, the current estimate is 323 Billion in $2012, this means the program is 43% over the predicted amount when accounting for inflation, this has been declining since 2009 high of 345 Billion. Of this increase apparently 40% of it is accountable to Lockheed faults, 22% for Pratt & Whitney and the rest is Government changes either in requirements(war spares) or how to estimate costs.

    The F-35 will have an individual 30 year operational life with production out to 2038 for a total 2,457 aircraft. The F-35 is replacing 1,200 F-16’s, 254 F-15C/Ds, 340 A-10’s, 100 Harriers, 662 Hornets and not scheduled to replace 200 F-15Es, 565 Super Hornets and 114 Growlers.


    Now what about relative to other aircraft? Development is pretty pricey, at 55 billion its more than the F-22 at 42 billion, and the Euro-fighter and Rafale are about 30-25 billion respectively, the LRS-B is estimated to cost 24 billion, the B-2 cost about 37 billion.

    How about aircraft unit costs? Unit Costs are often compared to older aircraft, this is not accurate as aircraft are always becoming more expensive as complexity and demands increase resulting in more highly capable, albeit expensive aircraft.

    In $2012 dollars the F-35A is 76/86(lowest/average) million over it’s production run, the F-35B/C is 94/109 million. The F-16 Block 52 is likely 73 million, A Super Hornet is 63/79 million, a Growler is 64/72, the Gripen E/F is around 80-85 mil, the Rafale C is 87mil and M is 100mil, the Eurofighter T3 costs 110 million in $2012,  the F-22 115/181 million These costs are UNRF. Unit costs are often confused between Unit Recurring Flyaway(basic airframe + engines + avionics), Unit Non-Recurring Flyaway(+ mission/weapon systems, ancillary and equipment), Procurement Unit Cost (+Spares), and Program Acquisition Unit Cost (+Development costs), it is important to compare the same cost measure. It is also very important to ensure calculations are made in same year dollars as inflation can rapidly change apparent pricing.

    Also to remember is the aircraft lifetime, the Super Hornet is rated for 6,000 hours years where as all F-35s are 8,000 hours, to add more hours to the Super Hornet is called a SLEP and costs 28 million for 3,000 hours. The Eurofighter is rated for 6,000 hours and Rafale 7,000 hours, the F-22 is 8,000 hours, as is the F-16.

    How about cost per flying hour?
    The F-35A flies 250 hours(higher capability simulators replace some flying hours)per year at the cost of $32.5k per hour, cost of $8.1 million per year. An active F-16 flies 316 hours per year at a cost of $8.2 million per year and 26k per hour, the F-16 does not include pods(Fuel, ECM, Targeting) required to reach similar capability as the F-35. The F-16s cost is also increasing as it get’s older and will soon eclipse the F-35As. It’s important to compare the same type of cost, there is Operational Cost Per Flying Hour and the Variable Cost Per Flying Hour which is considerably lower.


    An interesting exercise is the comparison of the F-22 to the F-35 projects. The F-22 started with an APUC of $35 million $1985 which is $70 million in $2009 in 2009 the APUC was $160 million with notable performance cuts and delays. Same goes for the F/A-18 although a much less risky program it still encountered significant issues such as a 50% price increase, schedule slippage, questionable performance etc. This GAO report was highly critical of the F-16 in 1977.

    The F-35’s development timeline is also relatively moderate. The Rafale started development in 1982 and introduced in 2001(19 years). The Euro-fighter started in 1983 and was introduced in 2003(20 years). The Raptor started in 1986 and entered service in 2005(19 years). The PAK-FA, an evolutionary aircraft, started in 2001 and will be introduced in 2017(16 years). The Gripen started development in 1979 and was introduced in 1998(19 years). The Hornet was a redesign of the YF-17(9 years) from 1975 to 1983(8 Years) from which the Super Hornet evolved from 1992 to 2000(8 years). The F-35 in comparison to all of these started in 1996 with USAF IOC in 2016(20 years). Whatever happened to the four year aircraft?


    12) Variants, There is an A version, the Conventional Take Off and Landing, the B version, a Short Take Off and Vertical Landing and C the Carrier Variant. The JSF designers were able to accommodate each of these with “virtually no scars” on the CTOL variant in regard to ship suitability.

    The STOVL variant‘s fan system is exactly where some of the CTOLs(and CV’s) fuel tanks are, by sacrificing fuel(24% less), weapons storage(1,000 pound bombs instead of 2,000 but still 4 SDB2s), heavier weight(3,000 pounds) and some slight fuselage changes it’s able to utilize a fan driven lift system. The F135 CTOL/CV engine produces 28k/43k(dry/wet thrust). The STOVL engine produces 27k/41k, in STOVL mode 5,025 pounds is diverted to the LiftFan which then produces 18,575 pounds of lift another 3,400 pounds is split between each of the Roll Posts and the engine itself produces 18,575 pounds of lift for a total 40,550 pounds of lift.


    The Carrier Variant has a large wingspan and tails, ailerons and strengthened structure, trade-offs are lower acceleration and max speed, benefits are larger fuel storage, better loiter time, tighter turn radius and allows it to perform carrier landings at very slow speeds and more steadily. The Carrier variant will have a smaller Spot Factor than the Super Hornet, 1.11 vs 1.24 relative to legacy Hornets.


    Procurement numbers can be found in the Fast Facts.

    Combat mode = Internal Stores + full fuel.


    Length(ft) Width(ft) Wing Area(ft) Empty Weight(lb) Internal Fuel(lb) Combat Radius(nm) Wing Loading (Empty/Combat,ft) Thrust/Weight (Empty/Combat,lb) Instant/Sustained turning
    F-35A CTOL 50.5 35 460 29,016 18,250 613 63/113 1.48/0.83 9g/4.6g
    F-35B STOVL 50.5 35 460 32,412 13,500 469 70/106 1.27/0.85 7g/4.5g
    F-35C CV 50.8 43 668 34,519 19,750 610 52/88 1.25/0.73 7.5g/5g

    13) Design Philosophy, the F-35 originates in the STOVL Strike Fighter(SSF) program around the single engine with a driveshaft driven fan system.  The first design had highly swept wings which produced unstable pitch up at even moderate Angles of Attack and was abandoned, the next design had canards and no horizontal tail, this was optimized for supersonic flight. The USAF was interested in replacing the F-16 with another single engine aircraft and it was demonstrated that a conventional variant could be easily made by removing the lift fan & drive-shaft then substituting them with a fuel tank, this was met with approval and the Common Advance Lightweight Fighter(CALF) program was born. With the addition of 4 new ground-attack missions emphasis changed from a fighter with strike capability to a strike aircraft with some fighter capability, this was reinforced by the Gulf War in which most Iraqi aviation assets were destroyed on the ground, stealth and BVR missiles were more mature and the advent of high-off-boresight missiles reduced the need for maneuverability. The weapon bays were enlarged to carry 2,000 pound bombs at the price of increased wave drag, and the canards were replaced with horizontal tails and the aerodynamic center was shifted forward, this resulted in greater sub/transonic performance at the expense of supersonic performance. In addition each variant is highly different, using common parts where possible but otherwise using cousin or unique parts where necessary to tailor each variant to their respective roles. To accommodate the lift fan for the STOVL version it uses an entirely unique neck area that has a significant bulge which the A and C does not have. STOVL only has a minor impact on the other variants through the necessity of bifurcated inlet ducts(which come with stealth benefits) and a required lighter weight to keep commonality high.


    We can get a good idea of how different mission sets result in different aerospace designs by comparing the F-22 and F-35. The F-22 and F-35 both carry the same amount of fuel, the F-35A/C has a preferred range of >600nm while carrying 5k munitions due to basing and targets in Iraq and Iran, the F-22 has a more relaxed combat radius of around ~500nm with only AA missiles because it’s role is primarily air superiority. The F-35A/C has to carry 2,000 pound bunker busters and cruise missiles while the F-22 only carries 1,000 pound bombs. The F-22 is vastly larger 62 long, 44.6 wide, 16.8 high vs the smaller F-35 at 51.4 x 34 x 14.2, the larger size of the F-22 gives it a better Sears-Haack aerodynamic profile reducing it’s wave drag allowing it to reach a very high top speed, the F-35 on the other hand focus’s on the Area Rule giving it good transonic performance. The F-35s width is slightly more than an F-18s and is dictated by it’s engine and weapons bay lengths. To have a side-by-side weapons bay like the F-22 that carries 2x2k munitions and 2 AA missiles the aircraft would need to be significantly longer, more than the F-22 because of it’s large single engine(5.16m to 5.59m) and longer bay (3.7m to 4.1m) requirements, this would make the aircraft much heavier, degrading performance and increasing cost. Therefore we can conclude that the F-35s focus on stealthy strike missions and affordability is the primary driver of it’s aerodynamic profile.





    F-35 UPGRADES OR FUTURE SYSTEMS.

    1) Engine. The current F135 engine has a high bypass of 0.57 to allow for long range cruising, the higher the bypass the more efficient the engine, the lower it is the more power it can produce, the F-16 uses the F100 with a bypass of 0.36. Under the ADaptable Versatile ENgine Technology(ADVENT) program initiated in 2007, the USAF sponsored the design of a Variable bypass engine where an engine can alter the bypass to a higher ratio by opening up bypass airflow channels, this allows for the design of a lower bypass engine to provide much more thrust while also being able to attain good fuel efficiency, a beneficial side effect is a reduced thermal exhaust signature. Out of the ADVENT program came the Adaptive Engine Technology Development(AETD) program, this had a more specific goal of creating a F-35 post 2020’s engine upgrade using ADVENT technology to provide 25% better thrust-specific fuel consumption, 5% more military power and 10% more maximum thrust for 30% greater range. GE was awarded to incorporate ADVENT technology with P&W, a working engine is expected in 2017, with an ADVENT engine the aircraft can also tap the third stream of air for heat dumping leading to a large reduction in heat issues and IR signature. There is currently strong support behind investing in the engine.


    Linkovi:
    https://comprehensiveinformation.wordpress.com/
    http://www.f-16.net/forum/download/file.php?id=21926
    http://www.janes.com/article/50010/pentagon-to-build-new-variable-cycle-engine-for-f-35-and-other-aircraft
    http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/farnborough-pratt-to-test-new-adaptive-fan-f135-variant-next-374283/
    http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/full-advent-engine-tests-meet-fuel-heat-goals-ge-408182/
    http://aviationweek.com/awin/advent-invent-address-f-35-needs-and-look-ahead
    http://aviationweek.com/awin/pratt-rolls-out-ge-stays-afrl-advanced-engine-demo
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/06/us-united-tech-pratt-fighter-idUSKBN0LA07A20150206?irpc=932
    http://americanmachinist.com/news/usaf-taps-ge-develop-new-jet-engines


    Zadnja promjena: Admin; sub ruj 10, 2016 5:22 pm; ukupno mijenjano 1 put.
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    andree

    Posts : 41
    Join date : 13.03.2016

    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by andree on sub ruj 10, 2016 5:12 pm

    Operational Assessment of the F-35A Argues for Full Program Procurement and Concurrent Development Process

    By John Venable

    The F-35A Lightning II’s sensors, stealth, and overall capability have been defended by the government and industry, while pundits and politicians have concentrated on developmental issues, cost overruns, and maneuverability limitations. The F-35A is a generational leap beyond other multirole fighters, and thanks to concurrent development, its technology will be the freshest ever fielded. Its performance in an air-to-surface (attack) mode has been well accepted, but many have questioned the Lightning II’s performance in aerial combat. Only the pilots who have flown the fighter actually know how well the Air Force version of the F-35 can perform, and the 31 who were surveyed for this paper expressed a high degree of confidence in this extraordinary fighter. The U.S. government should fulfill the entire programmed acquisition of the F-35A on its current schedule and apply the lessons learned from its concurrent development to every other major acquisition program in the future.

    This paper will discuss benchmarks for classic fighter technology, maneuverability, stealth, and tactics. It will examine the F-35’s faculties and compare them with the technology, performance, and cost of the generation of multirole fighters[1] that precedes it. That examination will reinforce the jet’s faculties for the air-to-ground missions of all three F-35 variants:

    F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Land (Air Force);
    F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (Marine Corps); and
    F-35C Aircraft Carrier-based (Navy).


    All three are designed for different basing environments that affect the way each variant performs in the air combat arena. This paper will explore the handling characteristics and air-to-air performance of the Air Force version of the jet, based on the opinions of 31 experienced U.S. Air Force fighter pilots currently flying the Lightning II. Their depth of experience in front-line, fourth-generation fighters, as well as with the F-35A, delivers unrivaled perspective and confidence in this extraordinary fighter.

    Evolution of Fighter Technology
    The Department of Defense (DoD) has pushed the defense industry into a continuing quest for more speed, altitude, turning performance, and lethality of munitions—a quest that has defined the jet age. The lineage of jet fighters is generally classified in terms of five generations that are separated by significant leaps in the qualities of speed, weaponry, maneuverability, the ability to detect and engage targets, and/or the ability to mask detection by the opposition.

    Global competitors are currently operating at near parity in fighter speed, as well as in range and lethality of weaponry. While follow-on generations of fighters may joust again in those two areas, this paper will concentrate on the remaining three categories: energy and maneuverability, detection of the enemy, and the ability to mask detection by the opposition.

    Energy and Maneuverability (Em)
    The ability to outaccelerate, outclimb, and outturn opposing aircraft has been a part of air combat since its inception. Jet engines were introduced in the 1940s, allowing the first generation of jet fighters to climb higher and fly faster than piston-engine aircraft. However, once those jets got in a turning engagement—or dogfight—their additional weight, coupled with the low thrust available from their archaic jet engines, was no more a match for the G-loads of aerial combat than their piston-engined predecessors were. As engine technology increased, so did aircraft weight, and while many second-generation fighters could fly faster than Mach 1, both first- and second-generation fighters were underpowered sports cars under the G-loading of a turning fight.

    With the advent of longer-range missiles, beyond-visual-range (BVR) tactics came about that allowed fighters to engage adversaries before they merged, forgoing the need in many minds for turning fights. America entered the Vietnam War believing that the age of the missile was at hand, and many senior leaders thought the requirement for heady maneuvering and gun-toting aircraft was behind us.

    It wasn’t. F-4s were the first production fighters capable of Mach 2, but when paired against a poorly trained Vietnamese adversary flying often dated aircraft, the kill ratio was almost one-to-one in the early stages of the war. The services had removed much of the air-to-air dogfight training that pilots received, and the results were telling: The United States lost almost one fighter for every North Vietnamese kill that it claimed.

    The U.S. Air Force and Navy moved immediately to hone air-to-air dogfighting skills and tactics that would change the kill-to-loss ratios considerably. By the end of the war in Vietnam, the need for skilled pilots and well-developed tactics was a lesson (re)learned. That lesson extended into the next series of fighter aircraft designs, which were centered on the ability to sustain high turn rates, requiring engines that delivered markedly higher thrust. Technological improvements, material, and weight reduction techniques delivered a fourth generation of aircraft with thrust-to-weight ratios that approached or exceeded one-to-one[2] in clean (non-combat) configurations.

    Technology will continue to improve the ability of the United States to defeat adversaries’ BVR. However, just as soon as it banks on the idea that capability removes the need for high energy and maneuverability, thinking enemies will respond. They will test the Air Force’s mettle with counter tactics and technologies that cause us to endure a fate similar to the one we endured during Vietnam until they can catch up technologically.

    Detecting Enemy Fighters
    Fighters use many different methods to detect other aircraft. Passive detection systems are becoming more and more prevalent, but the technology used most commonly to detect enemy aircraft is a fighter’s onboard radar. Radar has been around since the opening stages of World War II, but the first radars mounted in jet fighters were very limited in their capability.

    Radar. First-generation jet fighters had no real radar detection capability. The F-86, made famous during the Korean War, relied on ground-based radars and controllers to guide pilots to a point where they could pick the targets up visually—a process known as Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI). Onboard radars were capable of providing precise range data for computed gunsights, but little more.

    Second-generation air-to-air fighters were designed to intercept high-flying nuclear bombers, and the best of them could detect and lock onto fighter-sized targets at 15 miles. Detection ranges for third-generation F-4s and Russian MIG 21s were a bit longer and included the capability to fire radar-guided missiles, but both relied heavily on GCI to find the enemy, and most successful gun or missile engagements were tail aspect shots: attacking from behind an aircraft.

    Fighters enjoyed significant improvements in detection range and clutter[3] resolution with the fourth generation. Aircraft like the F-15C realized detection ranges on fighter-sized targets in excess of 50 miles and could readily engage aircraft flying well below their altitudes for a true look-down-shoot-down capability.

    In the late 1990s, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars entered the fight, delivering contact ranges in excess of 100 miles. Fighters so equipped have a huge advantage over those with dated pulse-Doppler radars, and when mated with a medium-range air-to-air missile, they deliver quite a leap in capability. Having an AESA radar alone does not elevate a fighter to the fifth generation, but fourth-generation fighters that possess it along with one or two other improvements are often referred to as four-plus-generation fighters. Among “other” improvements, some four-plus-generation fighters possess unique passive detection capabilities.

    Passive Detection. Aircraft of all types emit several different types of detectable noise. It makes sense that without care, radar emissions from an aircraft can be detected by opposing aircraft at least as far away from the source as the transmitting aircraft can detect enemy fighters. The Russian AA-10E Alamo missile is designed to exploit this by using passive radar homing to follow radar emissions from enemy fighters all the way to the source without relying on active radar returns from the firing aircraft from launch to impact.[4] What this implies is that the launching Russian fighter has at least a limited ability to “see” and launch on opposing fighters without emitting any radar emissions of its own.

    The other sources of detectable noise are less well known, but with the radar example, they begin to come into view.[5] Two-way radios, some navigational aids, data-links, engine or airframe heat—anything that emits radio, radar, heat, or traceable light can be used by enemy radar sites, fighters, and surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs) to find, fix, and target aircraft. The three factors that determine the ability (and advantage) that one fighter has to detect another in any one of those arenas are:


    • Sensor sophistication and sensitivity,
    • Sensor fusion of detection sub-systems into a display that pilots can rapidly understand and digest, and
    • Stealth and the target’s ability to mask its own emissions or returns.


    Sensors. Modern fighters have several sensors and sub-systems at their disposal. In addition to radar, they include radar warning receivers (RWR); Infra-Red Search and Track (IRST) systems; and passive coherent location systems (PCLS).

    Radar warning receivers were developed following the first several U.S. aircraft losses to Soviet-made SA-2 missile systems in Vietnam. Pilots could see the missiles respond to the movements of targeted aircraft, so engineers designed a detection system for the radars that guided those missiles to their targets. They mounted archaic-radar warning systems on fighter aircraft and displays inside their cockpits. Once the systems were on board, aircrews developed tactics that would allow appropriately warned pilots to outmaneuver the missiles.

    Initially, RWRs were directional and would merely tell pilots which clock position they should search for the inbound missile. Over time, engineers developed methods for estimating the range of known threats, and pilots and engineers working together developed methods to triangulate and bomb the location of SAMs. Anti-radiation missiles were developed, and the pairing was given to SAM-hunting units designated as Wild Weasels. That capability improved with the HARM[6] Targeting System (HTS) of the fourth-generation F-16CJ.

    The HTS allows F-16CJs working in flights of two or more jets to triangulate and fire on SAM systems more rapidly by linking and processing the collective data of the formation of jets. The target location solutions that the HTS offers are so precise and timely that missile systems can frequently find and destroy enemy SAMs even after the sites shut down their radar emitters on word of inbound missiles. The HTS gives its pilots markedly elevated levels of situational awareness from both SAM and air-to-air threats, but it comes at a cost. The HTS “pod” is an external, un-jettisonable[7] modification to the F-16 that adds weight and a significant amount of drag to the jet’s sleek lines.

    Fourth-generation F-15Cs are now being modified for a next-generation electronic warfare suite called Eagle Passive/Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS). EPAWSS reportedly will give the Eagle sophisticated jamming, geolocation, target-identification, infrared threat-detection, and decoy capabilities[8]—a modification that is postulated to give the F-15C several fifth-generation faculties.[9]

    The details of the F-35 threat-detection system or RWR are classified, but interviews of pilots who have flown both the F-16CJ and the F-35 state that a single F-35 has the ability to locate, identify, and triangulate emitter locations faster and with greater precision than can a flight of three F-16CJs that surround the emitter.[10] The associated systems work against air-to-air threats just as well and are all internal to the F-35, forgoing the need for external pods or stores that would slow down the jet or give it a larger radar cross section (RCS).[11] This system alone helps to make all three versions of the F-35 standouts in the air-to-ground mission sets of the multirole fighter community.

    Infra-red Search and Track systems were developed for fourth-generation platforms. IRST systems search and even scan the forward hemisphere of equipped fighters for the infrared emissions of threat aircraft. Some systems incorporate a magnified optical sight system to help pilots visually identify target aircraft at significant distances. The Eurofighter Typhoon’s PIRATE IRST reportedly can detect unshielded, subsonic fighters approaching at high aspect (head on) at 30 nautical miles.[12] These systems possess equipment and algorithms that can provide the range to detected threats but are significantly hampered by weather and atmospheric conditions.

    The F-35 Distributed Aperture System (DAS) is an IRST system with six ports that stare simultaneously in all directions. The DAS system is projected within and slaved to the Helmet Mounted Display (HMD), allowing pilots to perform near-spherical visual scans even when looking “through” the F-35 with 20/40 clarity, day or night. The DAS is enhanced by the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) that provides precision air-to-air scan and track, as well as a solid air-to-surface targeting capability. EOTS retains the aircraft’s stealth and is linked to the jet’s integrated central computer through a high-speed fiber-optic interface.

    The two IR systems will automatically detect and display threats on cockpit LCDs and in the pilot’s HMD. The IR spectrums associated with particular aircraft and missile systems are stored within the jet’s algorithms, allowing the jet, in conjunction with other passive and active sensors,[13] to positively identify aircraft and/or inbound missiles from all directions, without limit to the number of targets simultaneously tracked.

    Passive coherent location systems and systems with similar capabilities encompass a class of radar systems that detect and track objects by processing reflections from non-cooperative and perhaps unintended emission sources in the environment, such as commercial broadcast and communications signals.[14] With the right equipment and a powerful processor, equipped platforms can determine the location, heading, and speed of aircraft.[15] It is believed that high-end, fourth-generation fighters incorporated some form of PCLS in their systems,[16] and it would be a bad bet to wager against any fifth-generation fighter having this capability.

    While each of these active and passive systems can significantly increase a fighter’s advantage, there are drawbacks. Each system may well offer independent methods for finding and identifying target aircraft, but trying to incorporate several separate onboard system displays in a pilot’s cross-check[17] and correlating that information can be a nightmare. Then there are the off-board feeds from aircraft within the formation and systems like Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System (Joint-STARS); RC-135 Rivet Joint; and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). This is where sensor fusion becomes critical.

    Sensor Fusion. Coupling the products of off-board feeds with a fighter’s active radar, RWR, IRST, PCLS, and/or other passive detection systems into a single, correlated display can be a godsend for a pilot’s situational awareness. It reduces cockpit cross-checks and delivers the kind of confidence that few fourth-generation platforms incorporate. While many four-plus-generation fighters incorporate sensor fusion, the magic within the F-35’s fusion is the middle-ware that sits between the sensors and the displays. Once any sensor detects a threat, it will move to learn everything it can on the contact by cross-referencing every other onboard, off-board, and overhead sensor to identify (ID) it.

    Coupling or fusing the ID signatures from each of the complementary systems into a reliable declaration of friend or foe will significantly reduce pilot workloads. It will also allow the United States and its allies to relax their rules of engagement, freeing pilots to engage enemies earlier and with greater effect. Bringing even some of that fusion into an HMD will give the associated pilot an advantage that will be hard to overmatch.

    Those who are not read into its classified faculties can only speculate as to the specific components of and feeds within the F-35’s system of systems, but the experiences of the pilots who were interviewed for this paper are telling. All but three of the 31 pilots interviewed noted “ghosts” (multiple display images for the same threat) and other glitches in sensor fusion, but all 31 expressed high confidence in the software and engineering modifications and improvements that they had witnessed to date. Each pilot also expressed confidence in the individual F-35 system components and the belief that sensor fusion was months away from delivering a remarkable system.

    Stealth. Situational awareness (SA) is a pilot’s real knowledge of the tactical situation around him or her. The quest to maximize your SA while denying an opponent’s is unending. Denying an adversary’s SA of what is happening in the air can be accomplished by using overwhelming numbers, cloaking, and maneuver/deception/subterfuge.

    The U.S. gave up on the idea of flooding an opponent’s radar (or air defense system as a whole) with mass numbers of fighters many years ago, choosing instead to use advantages in leading-edge technology and tactics and training to defeat the enemy. If either is accomplished effectively, fighters get nearly unlimited, unchecked moves while their opponents try to discern where they may have gone after the last maneuver they believe they witnessed. This is particularly valuable for multirole platforms tasked with the Weasel mission of suppression of enemy defenses or interdiction in a denied-access (heavily defended) area.

    One way to do that is by denying enemy aircraft sensors the opportunity to detect other aircraft. For radar, the detectability factor is measured in square meters of radar cross section (RCS). RCS can be lowered by using special materials, construction, and fabrication techniques, but the process is extraordinarily complicated and expensive, and most stealth systems are very hard to maintain.[18]

    It is important to realize that stealth is limited by an aircraft’s initial design. Many fighters require external stores to conduct any combat mission, and the RCS of a clean jet[19] (the number commonly published for aircraft) is not the same RCS that those same jets will have when flying into combat. The RCS for combat-equipped fighters is generally much higher.


    When it works, stealth is a game changer that will give those that have it a big advantage against the opposition. In mock dogfights, F-35As have repeatedly gone completely undetected by their fourth-generation adversaries, resulting in impressively high kill ratios. When stealth is incorporated into every surface and component on and within a jet, the effects upend the generational chart, rendering every non-stealth platform equivalent to the detection and engagement faculties of (at best) a second-generation fighter.


    As of this writing, every fourth-generation or four-plus-generation fighter that faces the F-35A may hold the energy and maneuverability of high-end platform, but each will be left with the situational awareness of a GCI-less, second-generation fighter. Over time, GCI capabilities will grow, allowing ground-based radar controllers to vector enemy fighters toward the F-35s, but those pilots will be left to pick up their opponents visually, just as fighters did in the Korean War. They will do that until their own breakthroughs allow the fielding of operational stealth fighters and/or their sensors can be tuned to detect an F-35 in time to be tactically effective. While this technological advantage will likely be with the U.S. and its allies for many years to come, the U.S. cannot allow fighter energy and maneuverability or our tactics to wither.

    F-35A Dogfight Performance
    Much has been written about the F-35A’s performance in an air combat environment, and while it is important to see how well it stacks up against its fourth-generation predecessors, there are some important facts to keep in mind in any comparison. The F-35A is still under development, and incremental design restrictions limit the G-loading that pilots have to 7.0 Gs. The fly-by-wire design is predicated on software control laws (CLAWs) that act as a governor to limit pilots from max-performing the jet in a way that could cause it to go out of control.[20] For purposes of this paper, those limitations were taken as is, and pilots were asked not to speculate about how the jet will perform when those restrictions are lifted.

    The energy and maneuverability (Em) performance of fourth-generation fighters is very often exaggerated by the idea that these fighters fly combat missions in absolutely clean “airshow” configurations. No fourth-generation jet in the U.S. inventory (or any other) goes into combat that way, and most will carry significant external stores (munitions, fuel tanks, and targeting pods) in order to accomplish their mission. When pilots know they are about to enter a dogfight situation requiring the best Em their jets can deliver, they will jettison fuel tanks and unexpended bombs, but almost every pod, rack,[21] or missile rail is permanently affixed,[22] adding significant un-jettisonable weight, drag, and RCS.

    If stores and weapons are jettisoned prior to hitting air-to-ground targets, pilots will fail in their primary (multirole) tasking. Even post-jettison, the G-restrictions associated with targeting, forward looking infrared (FLIR), and HTS pods will remain and generally restrict jets to 8.0 Gs or less. While most fighters still perform adequately in those post-jettison configurations, air combat Em performance suffers considerably.

    A Direct Comparison. Thirty-one experienced pilots currently flying the F-35A were asked to rate the energy and maneuvering characteristics of their previous fourth-generation fighters in a combat configuration throughout the dogfighting maneuver envelope in a combat configuration[23] after jettisoning their external stores. They were then asked to rate the performance of the F-35A using the same scale, with fuel and internal munition loads associated with a combat loadout[24] under their current G and CLAW restrictions.[25] The F-35A compared well to the four other fighters (F-15C, F-15E, F-16C, and A-10) in most every regime. (For the total results and responses from the pilots of each respective fighter, see Chart 1.)

    Each pilot was then asked to select which fighter he would rather fly in combat if he were to face a clone flying the other jet in six different air-to-air situations. (See Chart 2.) If the pilot selected an F-15C in a short-range setup, for example, he felt he could outperform a pilot of equal abilities in the F-35A. Pilots selected the F-35A 100 percent of the time in beyond-visual-range situations and over 80 percent of dogfighting situations where energy and maneuverability are critical to success.



    The F-35A was not designed to be an air superiority fighter, but the pilots interviewed conveyed the picture of a jet that will more than hold its own in that environment—even with its current G and maneuver restrictions. In the words of an F-16C Weapons School Graduate and instructor pilot now flying the F-35A, “Even pre-IOC,[26] this jet has exceeded pilot expectations for dissimilar combat. (It is) G-limited now, but even with that, the pedal turns[27] are incredible and deliver a constant 28 degrees/second. When they open up the CLAW, and remove the (7) G-restrictions, this jet will be eye watering.”[28]

    Concurrent Acquisition and Program Management
    While the F-35A is on the path to becoming an extraordinary multirole fighter, the road has been filled with controversy about its concurrent development acquisition program. Like any other system that relies on technology, fighters have technically viable lifespans, and the clock of utility begins well before the system is ever fielded. A case in point was the air-to-air variant of the Royal Air Force’s Tornado F-3. The technology that went into its design had been proven before the fighter was built. There were no technological leaps, no real risks assumed in the design or acquisition process, and by the time it was fielded in the 1980s, it was virtually obsolete. The F-3 served the RAF for over 20 years, but it was never considered a first-rate fighter or even one that would perform well against the threats of the era.

    The requirement for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) came about when technology was growing so rapidly that it would be hard to field a jet that was not already approaching obsolescence. DoD agreed on an approach that would combat that challenge by moving to acquire a system while many components of the aircraft were still undergoing some level of research and development. That concurrent development brought with it a level of risk that by its very nature will be present throughout the course of the F-35’s initial fielding.

    Component, sensor, and airframe development were (and still are) all happening at the same time, and even small changes in the weight, size, performance, and schedule of any component could affect the weight, size, performance, and schedule of the entire system. While some believe the risk associated with portions of the F-35 concurrent development program equate to acquisition malpractice,[29] the benefits are potentially enormous. The risks of developmental delays and cost overruns were accepted to mitigate an even bigger risk: that the United States would field its own version of the Tornado F-3. The costly risk of delays was known, and only extraordinary leadership could mitigate it. That should have been factored into the whole of the acquisition process, but it wasn’t.

    No matter how much legislation is put forth or how many more lines are added to the Federal Acquisition Rules (FARs), any major acquisition program will falter without consistent, competent leadership. The F-35 is the biggest acquisition program in the history of the United States.[30] If concurrent development is coupled with a program of this size, the single biggest requirement for acquisition becomes competent, long-tenured leadership.

    In its first 18 years of existence, the JSF/F-35 program office had nine different directors—one every two years—and no matter how bright an individual may be, it takes at least a year to become familiar with the interwoven complexities of such a program.[31] The tenure for the leader most critical to program success was driven more by the expected timing and progression of general officer career paths than it was by the requirements of the biggest acquisition program in history.

    It was only after delays and cost overruns aroused the ire of Congress that the Air Force put Lieutenant General Chris Bogdan at the helm of the program. In his four years on point, Bogdan has brought energy, honesty, and the kind of leadership that the program has needed for years. His time on point has not been without controversy, but he has proven that competent, stable leadership in that position is critical, and he has brought the F-35 to the precipice of the kind of technological success for which DoD and industry have been hoping—but at what cost?

    Cost and Capability
    At full-rate production, every F-35A that leaves the Lockheed-Martin facility in Fort Worth is projected to cost $80 million–$85 million.[32] When one considers the technology and cost of this system, it compares favorably with other recently fielded fighters.

    The F35A Lightning II is a fifth-generation fighter conceived in the 1990s. It began concurrent development in the mid-2000s and was declared IOC on August 2, 2016. The jet incorporates full stealth; an AESA radar; internal 360 degree IRST (DAS); an internal IR targeting system (EOTS); and other passive detection systems that are coupled through sensor fusion. In a combat configuration, all munitions, fuel, and targeting sensor and designation capabilities are carried internally, giving it a 9G capability throughout its operational envelope. Estimated full-rate production cost: $80 million–$85 million.
    The Eurofighter Typhoon is a four-plus-generation multirole fighter conceived and designed in the early 1980s and introduced into operational service in 2003. The jet itself has a reduced RCS, an AESA radar, internal forward looking IRST, and other passive detection systems that are coupled through sensor fusion. In a combat configuration, the targeting pod, external tanks, and weapons are all carried externally, affecting range, RCS, maximum G, sustained G, and maneuverability. Full-rate production cost: $119 million.[33]
    The F-15K Strike Eagle is a four-plus-generation multirole fighter conceived, designed, and initially fielded in the 1980s. This version of the jet is built for (and largely by) South Korea, offers no stealth or reduced RCS, and has an AESA radar and an IRST passive detection system. In a combat configuration, the targeting pod, fuel tanks, and weapons are all carried externally, affecting range, RCS, maximum G, sustained G, and maneuverability. Full-rate production cost: $108 million.[34]
    The Rafale B is a four-plus-generation multirole fighter conceived in the 1970s, designed in the 1980s, and initially fielded in the mid-2000s. The jet itself has a reduced RCS and infrared signature. It has been retrofitted with an AESA radar and possesses an internal IRST and other passive detection systems that are coupled through data/sensor fusion. In a combat configuration, the targeting pod, external tanks, and weapons are all carried externally, affecting range, RCS, maximum G, sustained G, and maneuverability. Full-rate production cost: $98 million.[35]
    The F-18E Super Hornet Block II is a four-plus-generation multirole fighter based on a design initially conceived in the mid-1990s. The refined aspects of the Block II were designed and fielded in the mid-to-late 2000s and include an AESA radar but no stealth or reduced RCS. In a combat configuration, the targeting pod, external tanks, and weapons are all carried externally, affecting range, RCS, maximum G, sustained G, and maneuverability. Full-rate production cost: $78 million.
    The JAS-29C Gripen is a fourth-generation multirole fighter conceived in 1979, designed in the 1980s, and initially fielded in the late 1990s. The jet has a pulse-Doppler radar and offers no stealth or reduced RCS. In a combat configuration, the targeting pod, external tanks, and weapons are all carried externally, affecting range, RCS, maximum G, sustained G, and maneuverability. Full-rate production cost: $69 million.[36]
    While the prices of these six fighters can be debated, none of the fourth-generation or four-plus-generation jets can compete with the air-to-ground capabilities of the F-35. In its air-to-ground roles, the F-35A can find, fix, target, and drop on ground threats or targets more quickly and more accurately than any other fighter in the world and without the need for external stores—all in a denied-access (high-threat) environment.

    Nor would other fighters fare well if pitted against the F-35A in aerial combat. In an air-to-air BVR situation, the F-35 can locate and target every other combat-configured jet before their pilots become aware of the F-35’s presence. Even if one of the other fighters survived a BVR engagement, the external (un-jettisonable) pods, racks, and rails of each opponent would give a completely clean, combat-configured F-35A a distinct advantage.

    The F-35A and the other fighters may be comparably priced, but the F-35A is a full generation ahead of any other multirole fighter nearing production. Nevertheless, there are valid questions that remain:

    How long will this advantage last, and
    How will the United States counter the threat when hostile nations begin to catch up with this leap in technology?
    The Fleeting Edge of Technology
    For the better part of 30 years and the first three generations of jet fighter aircraft, the United States kept a slight lead on both adversaries and allies in technology and/or tactics. This changed with the advent of stealth, and that technological leap put the U.S. 10–15 years ahead of the threat. Nations that fall behind fight for parity by developing better tactics or fielding greater numbers until they can once again compete technologically.

    The enemy is and always will be a thinking being, and even a slight change in dated equipment, coupled with novel tactics, can sometimes be a game changer. The F-117A was developed in the 1970s and entered service in 1983. With it came the age of stealth, and the U.S. Air Force (much as it had in the 1960s in response to the age of the missile) felt that it was all but untouchable. That proved to be valid during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. In 1999, however, the Yugoslavian air defenses were composed of dated systems, one of which was the SA-3 GOA, a SAM system fielded by the Soviet Union in 1961. The Serbs used clever tactics and a nearly 40-year-old system to shoot down an F-117A.

    The U.S. Air Force had become complacent when it sent that F-117 into what it believed to be a low-threat environment with no electronic countermeasures support from any other U.S. platform. With no internal jamming system of its own, it relied wholly on stealth for self-protection, and this was not enough. When arrogance takes hold of the technologically advanced, laggard nations can use tactics to level the playing field until they catch up with the technology.

    Both the Russians and the Chinese are working to field a viable fifth-generation stealth fighter, but even holding leaked or pilfered classified U.S. data, they are discovering just how challenging stealth can be. Nevertheless, the Air Force F-35A’s superior technology, energy, and maneuverability will give this platform a dominant edge for some time to come. Its stealth is remarkable, and its package of internal electronic countermeasures can detect and electronically blind the newest enemy sensors and SAM and radar systems without highlighting itself to a threat.

    What Should Be Done
    The United States Air Force will begin the slide back into its own Vietnam (or Yugoslavian) level of ineffectiveness the moment senior leaders and industry representatives use technological dominance to reduce flying time, tactics training, and integrated operations. To prevent that from happening, the Air Force must revitalize its flying hour and tactics training programs to give every fighter pilot the time in the air that he or she needs to dominate the skies when stealth is no longer ours alone.

    With this in mind, there are at least four specific actions that Congress and the Department of Defense should take:

    Move forward with the purchase of the full Air Force program of record of 1,763 F-35A fighters. Even now, the sensors and sensor fusion of this platform outclass any other fourth- or fifth-generation fighter currently in the air. Experienced pilots rate the air combat faculties of the F-35 as better than or equal to any other combat-configured fourth-generation fighter in the U.S. inventory—even with the jet’s current restrictions and G-limits.
    Fully fund DoD’s requested baseline budget and the overseas contingency operation budget. The edge that the F-35A brings in the air-to-ground world is incredible, and its price is comparable to those of jets that would never stand a chance against it in the air. The Air Force is currently deferring the purchase/cashing in on F-35As to pay for other critical needs that have gone unfunded or underfunded by Congress. That practice needs to end immediately.
    Continue concurrent development for platforms and systems requiring leading-edge technology. There are risks associated with concurrent development, but the gains and contracting lessons gleaned through the F-35A program are significant and need to be applied to systems that are susceptible to fielding obsolescence.
    Solidify acquisition leadership for all major (Cat I) acquisition programs by mandating four-year tenures for the heads of all program offices. The complexities of any such program are incredibly high, and the only way to deliver excellence on time and within budget to make the program fully mission capable is through extraordinary, stable leadership.
    Conclusion
    The F-35 is an expensive platform, but it is notably more effective and in many cases cheaper than any other four-plus-generation multirole fighter in the world. No other nation’s fielded fighter would fare well in an engagement against the F-35, and no other multirole fighter currently on the market would survive, much less thrive, in a modern-day high-threat environment. The United States needs to fulfill the F-35A’s complete fielding and look at the concurrent development process that brought it to fruition as a model for similar rapidly growing systems and technologies.

    —John Venable, a former F-16C pilot with 3,000 hours of fighter time, is Senior Research Fellow for Defense Policy in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

    Appendix

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    Admin
    Admin

    Posts : 420
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    Age : 37
    Location : Zagreb

    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Admin on ned ruj 11, 2016 2:45 am

    Vrlo dug ali i odlican pristup stvari - ruski strucnjak analizira F-35, Kineski stealt i SU PAK50 ...
    ima krasan osvrt i na Mig29 (samo jedna manjina forumskih idiota u Hrvata vjeruju i propagiraju kako je Mig29 uspjesan i dobar zrakoplov) ... Smile


    Krenimo redom:

    "Fresh opinion of a Russian military expert Mikhail Khodaryonok (Rus: Михаил Ходарёнок) about 5th generation planes, and comparison of main competitors: F-35 'Lightning-2' and Sukhoi T-50 (PAK-FA). This was on a radio show, and in that particular day, their camera broke. They always have video, but not that 1 day...

    The other two are hosts - Evgeniy Satanovskiy (Rus: Евгений Сатановский) and Sergei Korneevskiy (Rus: Сергей Корнеевский). The show is called 'From 2 until 5'.
    It seems despite all negative prediction and bad mouth, F-35 turned out to be a mighty machine, and total success. So, guys, please, if you don't want to embarrass yourself, don't post Pierre Sprey links and comments.
    It looks like T-50 is also not that far behind. Maybe lacks some components, but nothing too discouraging. It looks like it's gonna be a revolutionary machine for Russia, that emits confidence.


    The interview took place on 11.08.16." ...malo vise o samom expert Mikhailu  Khodaryonok-vu - jos jedan od interviwa: http://nahnews.org/581896-donbass-dolzhen-byt-razrushen-novaya-nacionalnaya-ideya-ukrainy/






    Zadnja promjena: Admin; ned ruj 11, 2016 3:59 pm; ukupno mijenjano 4 put/a.

    Miro.Kalas

    Posts : 15
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    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Miro.Kalas on ned ruj 11, 2016 2:37 pm

    preuzeto sa: http://defense-update.com/20160812_f35_thermal.html
    Radi se o tome kako i toplinski podpis nove americke perjanice nije tako jasan kao kod  F-16, Typhoon ili Su-27 ... Amerkanci se neoslanjaju na IRST tehnologiju, sve imaju zasnovano na radarskoj ali prema analizama bi mogli reci kako su uspjeli i u ravnomjernom rasporedjivanju toplinskog zracenja i kako se o tom aspektu vodilo dosta racuna. Clanak je zasnovan na analizama provedenim na testovima tijekom aeroshow i predpostavljaju kako u realnim borbenim uvjetima ova osobina F-35 Lightning II ce biti jako vazna ..


    F-35 Thermal Scan Highlights New Stealth Features


    FLIR Systems published today a short video depicting the F-35 Lightning II 5th Generation fighter during its flight display at the recent Farnborough Airshow (2016). The clip shows the JSF after a simulated takeoff, in forward flight, approach to vertical landing and hover.

    While the video highlights the extremely hot air exhaust during vertical hovering, it also shows the striking low thermal contrast of the skin, canopy and engine bay, against the sky, which testify to the Lightning II’s effective thermal masking. While the aircraft and exhaust are clearly visible against the sky background in the flypast, it is clear that such image is taken with maximum gain, which isn’t likely to be useful for normal operation. In other shots that are tuned to show the exhaust heat, the aircraft itself almost blends with background, as it would be, when seen in a front view that masks most of the jet exhaust. Low contrast objects would be less detectable by thermal imagers, at long range. For aircraft it also improves protection from heat seeking missiles.

    Critics of the F-35 claim that while its stealth design denies its detection by radars, infrared imagers can easily spot the aircraft at long range, by its heat signature. Unlike Russian, Chinese and European aircraft manufacturers that have employed infra-red search and track (IRST) technologies, US services are relying almost exclusively on radar for aerial situational awareness. While the F-35, like every physical object, has a thermal signature, this thermal scan shows its designers made a significant effort to ‘flatten’ its thermal image, making the aircraft less detectable and trackable at long distance.

    The video clip shown below compares the recent images taken with FLIR Systems’ new Star SAFIRE 380-HDc high-definition FLIR, with a similar video taken by another FLIR sensor in 2010, showing the F-22 Raptor. At the recent Farnborough show, the F-35 Lightning II performed a flyby and hover but did not perform high-performance maneuvering like the Raptor did back in 2010. Previous FLIR videos of 4 Generation fighters such as the F-16, Typhoon, and Su-27 showed skin area with much higher thermal contrast.


    The IR image maps the hot areas inside the wheels and weapons bays, which are covered in forward flight.
    Particularly impressive are the rear vertical engine doors – one side is boiling hot, the other side is as cool as the rest of the aircraft. Photo: FLIR Systems

    The most intriguing view is the forward flight, showing the aircraft from a forward 3/4 view, in very high contrast to the sky but low contrast between the hot air and cold aircraft – note that the camera shows minimal difference between the aircraft and hot air plume of the engine exhaust. In the flight phases where the engine runs in high power, the contrast between the air exhaust and aircraft, especially around the engine, is striking.

    At that short distance, the FLIR SAFIRE 380-HDc camera details the hot and cold parts on the aircraft, for example, the windows of the Distributed Aperture Systems (DAS), where high-resolution IR cameras are located.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



    a ovo je toplinski podpis JAS Gripena



    Ostali zanimljivi linkovi:
    http://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2016/08/23/f-35-fighter-jet-thermal-scan-jnd-orig-vstan.cnn
    http://www.businessinsider.com/irst-cant-stop-f-22-f-35-2016-8
    avatar
    Mihal

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    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Mihal on pon lis 03, 2016 9:18 pm

    SRAZ TITANA Može li 'Divlja svinja' izdržati nalet 'Munje'?



    Washington, 03.10.2016., 16:27 Autor: B.V. komentara


    Pentagon je otvorio 'bitku svih bitaka' za poziciju glavnog jurišnog zrakoplova za podršku kopnenim jedinicama između legendarnog A-10 Warthoga i F-35 Lightning II

    A-10 Warthog i F-35 Lightning II ne mogu biti više različiti nego što jesu, no počelo je testiranje upravo ta dva zrakoplova u pentagonu, s ciljem odabira budućeg primarnom jurišnog zrakoplova za potporu kopnenim jedinicama američke vojske. Može li Warthog, ne pretjerano lijep ali u potpunosti smrtonosan i izdržljiv veteran, i dalje zadržati tron pred 'Munjom' koju muče brojna kašnjenja, probijanje budžeta i kojekakve neprilike tehničke naravi, pokazat će upravo spomenuti test. Ako F-35 dobije, A-10 odlazi u mirovinu po svoj prilici.
    U Pentagonu su se na testiranja odlučili nakon što je šef Odbora za vojsku američkog Senata, senator John McCain, 'izroštiljao' načelnika stožera američkog ratnog zrakoplovstva, generala Marka Welsha, oko njegovog prijedloga da zrakoplovi F-16 i F-15 preuzmu ulogu A-10 na bojnom polju nakon povlačenja tog zrakoplova iz uporabe, prenosi Business Insider.
    "Sramota je čuti da govorite takvo što", rekao je u travnju 2016. senator McCain generalu Walshu, referirajući se na umirovljenje Warthoga.
    otad se u SAD-u duboko preispituje mudrost odluke o eventualnom umirovljenju A-10 te se upućuje na velike rupe, koje bi nastale povlačenjem tog jedinstvenog borbenog zrakoplova iz aktivne službe.
    Ipak, F-35 je u posljendjih godinu dana uspio prebroditi više kriza i pokazati se kao sposoban zrakoplov, iznenadivši čak i svoje kritičare.
    Trenutno se u Pentagonu provode simulirani borbeni scenariji, kako bi se vidjelo može li F-35 izvesti sve misije kojima je A-10 suvereno vladao posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća.

    Uspjeh legendarnog Warthoga leži u njegovom jedinstvenom dizajnu, niskoj brzini leta i mogućnosti da izdrži pogotke iz jurišnog oružja te nastavi letjeti dalje. Iako Ured za kredibilitet američke vlade (GAO) ne navodi njegovo najjače oružje kao jednu od rupa koje će ostati, a riječ je o 30-milimetarskom višecjevnom topu u nosu zrakoplova, po kojem je A-10 i dobio nadimak "razbijač tenkova", mi ćemo ga, eto, spomenuti.
    Ipak, američko ratno zrakoplovstvo nije diglo ruke od svojeg pouzdanog veterana, već razmatra i druge opcije, poput nadogradnje ili čak proizvodnje novog zrakoplova, sličnog upravo A-10.


    I malo smijesne strane problematike:


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    Re: F-35 Lightning II

    Postaj by Sponsored content


      Sada je: čet srp 27, 2017 4:23 pm.